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Abstract (max. 2000 char.): 
 
This report is Deliverable 4.1 of the EU project “Wind Power Inte-
gration in Liberalised Electricity Markets” (WILMAR) and de-
scribes the application of two policy instruments, Tradable Emis-
sions Permits (TEP’s) and Tradable Green Certificates (TGC’s) for 
electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the European 
Union and the implications for implementation in the Wilmar 
model. 
 
The introduction of a common emission-trading system in the EU is 
expected to have an upward effect on the spot prices at the electric-
ity market. The variations of the spot price imply that some types of 
power generation may change the situation from earning money to 
losing money despite the increasing spot price. Heavy restrictions 
on emissions penalise the fossil-fuelled technologies significantly, 
and the associated increase in the spot price need not compensate 
for this. Therefore, a market of TEP’s is expected to have a signifi-
cant influence on the electricity spot price. However, the expected 
price level of TEP’s are met with great uncertainty and a study of a 
number of economical studies shows a price span between zero and 
270 USD per ton of CO2 depending on the participation or non-
participation of countries in the scheme.  
 
The price-determination at the TGC market is expected to be 
closely related to the price at the power spot market as the RE-
producers of electricity will have expectations to the total price paid 
for the energy produced, i.e., for the price of electricity at the spot 
market plus the price per kWh obtained at the green certificate mar-
ket. In the Wilmar model, the TGC market can either be handled 
exogenously, i.e., the increase in renewable capacity and an average 
annual TGC price are determined outside the model, or a simple 
TGC module is developed, including the long-term supply functions 
for the most relevant renewable technologies and an overall TGC 
quota. Both solutions are rather simple, but to develop a more ad-
vanced model for the TGC market seems to be out of scope for 
handling the interplay with the Wilmar model. The obligation for 
the TGC market is normally given on an annual basis, i.e., the cer-
tificate quota has to be fulfilled within a given year. This implies 
that to establish a TGC price on an hourly basis throughout the year 
is not only difficult, but irrelevant as well. The incorporation of 
model elements representing an annual quota for emission and de-
riving a TEP price seems more relevant for the Wilmar model. 
 
 
 
 
Risø National Laboratory 
Information Service Department 
P.O. Box 49 
DK-4000 Roskilde 
Denmark 
Telephone +45 46774004 
bibl@risoe.dk
Facsimile +45 46774013 
www.risoe.dk
2  Risø-R-1470 (EN) 
Contents
1 Introduction 5 
1.1 The Wilmar Project 5 
1.2 Overview of this Report 6 
2 Emission Permits and Green Certificate Markets within the EU 7 
2.1 Tradable Emission Permits 7 
2.1.1 The Baseline Scenario 8 
2.1.2 Scenario: Russia ratifies the Protocol 10 
2.1.3 Scenario: Emission Trade also with Japan and Australia 11 
2.1.4 Scenario: Inclusion of China resp. Some Developing Countries 12 
2.1.5 Participation or Non-Participation of the US 13 
2.1.6 Conclusion: Price Development in Different Trading Environment 15 
2.2 Tradable Green Certificates 16 
2.2.1 The TGC Approach 16 
2.2.2 Minimum and Maximum Prices 17 
2.2.3 Validity of Certificates 17 
2.2.4 Tradability of Green Certificates 17 
3 TEP Influence at the “Joint” Market Bidding 18 
3.1 Bidding at the Spot Market 18 
3.2 Influence of TEP on the Spot Price 18 
3.2.1 Allocation of Permits on the Electricity Sector 18 
3.2.2 TEP Prices 19 
4 TGC Influence on the “Joint” Market Bidding 21 
4.1 The Green Certificate Market – the Long Term Concept 21 
4.1.1 The Implications of a TGC Market for the Simulations in Wilmar 23 
4.2 The Green Certificate Market – The Short-Term 24 
4.3 Conclusions and Recommendations 25 
5 Influence of Interaction between TEP’s and TGC’s at the “Joint” Market Bidding 26 
6 Implications for Implementation in WILMAR 28 
6.1 Short-Term Aspects - Joint Market Operation 28 
6.2 Long-Term Aspects – The Long-Term Model 30 
7 References 31 
Risø-R-1470 (EN)  3 
Preface 
 
This report is Deliverable 4.1 of the EU project “Wind Power Integration in Liberalised Electricity 
Markets” (WILMAR). The aim of the Wilmar project is to investigate the technical and the economi-
cal problems related to large-scale deployment of renewable sources and to develop a modelling tool, 
which can be used to simulate alternative solutions providing a firm basis for decision-making by sys-
tem operators, power producers and energy authorities. 
 
This report describes the application of the two policy instruments, Tradable Emissions Permits 
(TEP’s) and Tradable Green Certificates (TGC’s) for electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources in the European Union. The report contains state-of-the-art for the two instruments and dis-
cusses the impacts and importance of the two instruments in a liberalised power market. The report 
further discusses the implications of TEP’s and TGC’s for implementation in the Wilmar model. 
  
This report is edited by Hans Ravn and Rune Schmidt, IMM Technical University of Denmark, based pri-
marily on contributions from Risoe National Laboratory and IER University of Stuttgart. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has during the last decade become an increasingly 
important issue in the energy and environmental policies of the European  
Union and its member states. In 2002, the European Union ratified the Kyoto protocol and thereby 
committed themselves to a common GHG reduction of 8% by the years 2008-2012 compared to the 
1990 level. According to the agreed burden sharing within the European Union, the overall EU target 
is converted into national GHG targets for each of the member states. 
 
In the implementation of these GHG –targets, the exploitation of renewable energy sources plays an 
important role within the European Union. The White Paper for a community strategy and action plan 
sets out an overall target of doubling the share of renewable energy sources (RES) contribution of 
gross inland energy consumption from 6% to 12% by 2010. As outlined in the White Paper, the in-
creased use of electricity produced from RES constitutes an important part of the measures to comply 
with the targets in the Kyoto protocol but also to serve other goals as security of supply and achieve 
greater social and economic cohesion within the Community (European Commission, 1997).  
 
Similar to the growing focus on environmental aspects of electricity supply, the process towards a 
liberalised electricity market has been going on for some years in the EU with the opening of the elec-
tricity market for trade. Electricity exchange markets have been established to facilitate electricity 
trade with full market access for all consumers and cross-border exchange of electricity. At present, 
almost no new RE technologies can economically compete on their own with conventional energy 
production technologies and new supportive instruments to promote electricity produced from RES 
are, therefore, needed. Consequently, these instruments must be compatible with the liberalised mar-
ket and ensure cost-effective investment in new RE technologies. Thus, in order to reach the environ-
mental goals and to promote electricity from RES, a number of different policy instruments have been 
introduced, which includes the establishment of a market for Tradable Emission Permits (TEP’s) and 
Tradable Green Certificates (TGC’s). 
 
Following the trend for market-based systems for electricity trading, the main core in the TEP and 
TGC schemes is to use the market forces to promote electricity from RES and to reach the environ-
mental goals. An important feature of the two schemes is, therefore, the possibility of international 
trading with green certificates and emission permits and is immediate suggestions for instruments of 
international co-operation. The introduction of new markets for tradable emission permits and green 
certificates will create two new interdependent products and they will turn interact with the electricity 
market. How the TEP and TGC markets interact with each other in a liberalised power market context 
is, however, not a trivial matter. On this basis, the aim of this report is to analyse the interactions be-
tween CO2 emission trading and markets for electricity produced from renewable energy sources in a 
liberalised market, including description on how to treat these issues in the electricity system model 
developed in the Wilmar project. 
 
1.1 The Wilmar Project 
Wilmar (Wind Power Integration in Liberalised Electricity Markets) is a research project supported by 
The European Commission under the Fifth Framework Programme and contributes to the implemen-
tation of the key action 5 “Cleaner Energy Systems, including Renewables” within the Energy, Envi-
ronment and Sustainable Development (EESD) Thematic Programme. The key task of the project is to 
analyse the integration of wind power in a large liberalised electricity system covering the following 
countries: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway and Sweden. The technical and market impacts of a 
large share of wind power in the North European electricity system will be quantified using a com-
prehensive model being built in the project. 
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The modelling and simulation efforts can be divided into two parts. One part consists of an investiga-
tion of the issue of system stability, i.e., the wind integration aspects connected to the fast (below 10 
minutes) fluctuations in the wind power production, with the use of dedicated power system simula-
tion tools. It includes the analysis of a number of case studies especially selected for large-scale inte-
gration of renewable energy generation and with expected potential stability problems. 
 
Secondly, the wind integration ability of large electricity systems with substantial amounts of power 
trade in power pools is investigated. With the starting point in existing models, an hour-per-hour 
simulation model is developed, and this modelling tool is used to investigate the technical and cost 
issues of integrating large amounts of wind power into the electricity system. The model will cover 
the two power pools: NordPool and European Power Exchange, i.e., Germany, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden and Finland. The developed model will be tested by different end-users, including a system 
operator and a power producer, which are expected to also be users of the final model. Finally, the 
results obtained will be summarised and used to provide recommendations about the technical integra-
tion possibilities, the integration costs of wind power and the organisation of electricity markets and 
power pools. 
 
This report is especially related to the second part of the project and has the following objectives: 
 
• To establish a state-of-the-art for CO2 –emission trading and green markets based on a short sur-
vey; 
• To analyse and develop the modelling relations for the impacts of CO2 –emission trading and 
green markets on the spot market price of power; 
• To discuss impacts and consequence of CO2 emission trading and green markets. 
 
1.2 Overview of this Report 
Chapter 2 deals separately with tradable green certificates and tradable emission permits and describes 
the general features of the two schemes. These are described in detail in Chapter 3 and 4 with particu-
lar focus on analysing impacts on the spot market bidding. Chapter 5 deals with analysing the interac-
tions between CO2 emission trading and markets for electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources in a liberalised market. 
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2 Emission Permits and Green Certificate Markets within 
the EU 
 
As previously described, the main idea of establishing new markets for emission permits and green 
certificates is to lower GHG emissions and to ensure a politically planned deployment of renewable 
energy technologies under liberalised market conditions. This chapter deals with the general features 
of a tradable emission permits scheme and tradable green certificates scheme, respectively, and de-
scribes some of the most important issues that arise when introducing these two schemes.  
 
2.1 Tradable Emission Permits 
In July 2003, the EU agreed to establish a cap-and-trade system to limit CO2 emissions from the 
power industry and other energy intensive industries. The main idea of the scheme is to allocate per-
mits of CO2 emission on companies that are to be traded on a national or international market. The 
trading element allows companies that have reduced their emissions by more than their allocated per-
mits to sell their “surplus” to others who are not able to reach their target. The overall environmental 
outcome is the same as if both companies used their allowances exactly, but with the important differ-
ence that both buying and selling companies benefited from the flexibility offered by trading.  
 
The cap-and-trade scheme is well established in environmental policy, particularly for the application 
of technical standards in the field of waste, water and air pollution (ozone and CO2), but only little 
experience has so far been gained with regard to CO2 emission trading. However, with the introduc-
tion of the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto protocol, a growing international market for CO2 emis-
sion trading has emerged and national CO2 emission schemes have also been introduced in  
Denmark and Great Britain.  
 
The emission trading system in the EU is to be implemented by 2005 and will be closely related to the 
flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto protocol. While the CDM or JI mechanisms allow certain flexibil-
ity, the price of the tradable permits solely depends on the supply and demand within the ratifying 
countries. The amount of available emission certificates increases with the amount of participating 
countries. The demand for certificates depends on the national commitment to climate gas emission 
reduction. Most of the industrialised countries subject to emission reduction show a demand for cer-
tificates while only some can supply a surplus in order to satisfy it. The effects of an emission-trading 
scheme in the EU, therefore, also depend on the participation or non-participation of other large coun-
tries responsible for large amounts of CO2 emissions. The ratification by major players, such as Rus-
sia, Japan, Australia or the US will especially have huge impact on the actual CO2 abatement costs 
within the EU. 
 
The climate agreement in the Kyoto protocol will only become binding if ratified by countries repre-
senting 55% of global GHG emissions and the U.S., which is the largest emitter, with a 37% share, 
has so far made it quite clear that it will not ratify the Treaty. Australia has argued that the protocol 
would be ineffective without U.S. participation and it is, therefore, unlikely to ratify. The EU, Swit-
zerland, Estonia, Latvia and Norway, and last but not least, Canada and other countries from, for ex-
ample, Central Europe and the Baltic together represent 44.2% of total CO2 emissions and have until 
now supported the Treaty. Russia, which is responsible for more than 17% of global CO2 emissions 
has the remaining vote that determines the fate of the Kyoto Protocol. Even as a former strong sup-
porter of the Treaty, Russia is at the moment unsure of the date of the ratification (Michaelowa and 
Koch, 2002).  
 
The EU has already decided to honour its commitment and reduce the climate gas emissions as agreed 
in the early COP and the costs for meeting its obligation depends on the behaviour of the other Proto-
col parties (Annex 1 countries). The following sub-chapters will try to shed some light into the im-
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pacts of different ratification scenarios by screening available studies on this subject. By the with-
drawal of the US from the protocol, the impacts of a participation or non-participation of the US is 
well documented in the scientific community. However, alternative scenarios are not common and, 
therefore, plausible considerations are undertaken. 
 
2.1.1 The Baseline Scenario 
A baseline scenario for comparison with possible trading schemes is chosen for this study. This is the 
scenario where emissions are traded only within the EU member states and not with other Annex I 
countries. In the aftermath of the initial Kyoto agreement, many economic modelling studies hinted at 
carbon prices of several hundred dollars per ton of carbon ($/tC)1 where there is no trading between 
countries down to the order of 100 dollars per ton of carbon (approximately 27,3 $/tCO2) in the case 
of unrestricted trading amongst the industrialised countries (Weynant, 1999). 
 
Considering trading only within the EU implies that the costs per ton of CO2 to meet the European 
Union emission caps result from marginal abatement costs in countries with only limited savings po-
tentials. Assuming that the carbon intensity of energy conversion technologies and installed capacities 
does not differ significantly within the EU, it seems feasible to conclude that abatement costs will be 
high. Although a small saving may be achieved by trading within the EU, without international trad-
ing and also excluding CDM and JI outside the EU, the conclusion of relatively high abatement costs 
is validated by most of the applied energy models. While the traded amounts within the EU are not 
explicitly specified in the studies, it seems obvious that countries with a high commitment will buy 
emission certificates from countries with lower caps. As to the amount of traded certificates, no study 
analyses these amounts in a detailed way. Grubb (2003) presents the score results of models in a con-
cise disposition. The resulting prices for carbon differ to a high degree, but all results hint at a com-
mon finding (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Double bubble: trading within the EU No trading: reduction targets have to meet on national level 
(Grubb, 2003) 
 
Figure 1: Impact of international trading on abatement costs. 
 
                                                     
1 Within the UNFCCC and the private sector, the main indicator resulted in prices for carbon dioxide instead of prices for 
carbon. The conversion factor between a ton of carbon and a ton of CO2 is 44/12. 
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Trading within the EU, but not with another Annex 1 country will result in comparatively high prices 
per ton CO2 and only slightly below a scenario where no trading is at all foreseen.2 The price per ton 
of CO2 ranges from 270 to 45 USD (Figure 1), depending on the study. It has to be noted that these 
studies do not generally include carbon sinks, non-CO2 gases, CDM, negative cost options or ancillary 
benefits. Therefore, the actual resulting costs might be well below the above-mentioned cost range.  
 
A trading scheme that does not extend beyond the EU would have a significant impact on the eco-
nomic competitiveness of the emission intensive industries of the member states. Assuming that a 
solitary trade within the EU implies a non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by other industrialised 
countries, the competitive situation of member states’ industries would become increasingly difficult. 
High costs for abatement or production cutbacks in emission intensive sectors would be the conse-
quence of a non-trading beyond EU borders. 
 
A study by Zhang (2001) presents much lower levels of national prices for emission permits in the 
case of block trading within the EU and no international trading. Zhang argues that official projec-
tions of GHG emissions in 2010 by most EU member countries are very close to their targets (Zhang, 
2001). Model results from Zhang project a price for emission rights of 9.1 USD/t CO2. It has to be 
ascertained that a segregate emission reduction in the EU with no further international participation by 
countries with a major share in worldwide emissions would not only lack ecological effectiveness, but 
it would also imply a high burden for the industries of the EU member countries and its products on 
the international markets. 
 
 Depending on Study 
Certificate Prices 9.1 – 270 USD/t CO2
 
An established EU carbon market already trades futures for emission rights of the years 2005-2007. 
Prices of trade closures indicate a price for emission certificates of 13 €/t CO2. Chances are that these 
prices might lower even more with inclusion of CDM and JI. 
 
The volume of emission certificates possibly traded in the first Kyoto period is not clear. A consider-
able amount of CO2 emissions has already been traded within the EU in the past years (see Figure 2). 
Point Carbon (www.pointcarbon.com, 2004) has estimated the EU emission trade volume - the EU 
Allowances Market - for the upcoming first period 2005-2007 of the European Emission Trading Sys-
tem (ETS) to increase from around 190 Mt CO2 in 2005 to over 900 CO2 in 2007 (2006 about 580 
CO2). It is expected that the amount of traded CO2 in the ETS will reach approximately 1,200 million 
tons in 2010, corresponding to approximately 46% of the Community’s 2010 CO2 emissions. 
                                                     
2 Except for the ABARE-GTEM model, no other model shows differing results and most models do not necessarily analyse 
the case of block trading. 
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(www.pointcarbon.com, 2004) 
 
Figure 2 Traded Volumes of CO2 in Europe in Mt per year in different trading schemes. 
 
2.1.2 Scenario: Russia ratifies the Protocol 
While the case of ratification only by the EU shows result in a high certificate price and only limited 
amounts of traded certificates, these amounts change significantly when Russia ratifies the protocol. 
Both Ukraine and Russia experienced a dramatic downturn in production after the breakdown of the 
former USSR and this downturn is also reflected in the CO2 emissions. 
 
The protocol requires the Russian Federation and Ukraine to stabilise their emissions at 1990 levels. 
However, due to the economic decline, a yearly surplus of 400 Mt carbon, normally referred to as 
“hot air”, accumulated in these countries during the last decade. Their greenhouse gas emissions 
dropped by 39% between 1990 and 1998. The main reason for this downturn was identified to be the 
economic disarray which followed the collapse of the former Soviet Union and central (economic) 
planning system (Victor et al., 2001). Russian experts estimate that about 60 or 70% of the reduction 
in the energy sector was due to the economic decline, about 8 to 12% to the initiation of institutional 
reforms in the energy sector and the rest to the substitution of fossil energy carriers through gas and 
other structural changes in the economy (Mastepanov et al., 2001). The Russian Federation could ac-
tually increase the emissions by 43% and even the Ukraine has a potential of 83% emission increase 
thereby still meeting the Kyoto emission targets. The ‘hot air’ of both Russia and the Ukraine implies 
a huge surplus in terms of available certificates and thus a very high trading potential. Without par-
ticipation of the USA in a trading scheme and only the EU as trading partner, this would imply a cer-
tificate price of nearly zero. This is due to the fact that the required CO2 reduction during the first 
commitment period, 2008-2012, would be less than or at least close to the carbon surplus in Russia, 
Ukraine and Eastern Europe. However, Russia and Ukraine could be the dominant sellers of emission 
permits and they can by withholding their carbon surplus from the market increase the permit price. 
By considering the possibility that Russia and Ukraine could act as oligopolies, the expected carbon 
certificate price and traded amounts has to be estimated for two cases; firstly, the case competitive 
Annex 1 trading and secondly, the Annex 1 Former Soviet Union acting as oligopolies. 
 
• As to the first case, it is assumed that the trading market is competitive, but the US does not ratify 
the protocol. With US absence from international trading, the largest potential buyer of certifi-
cates has disappeared. Therefore, a lessened demand for permits results in a lower permit price. In 
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(Persson and Azar, 2002), the total emissions in 2010 for the Annex 1 region (excluding the USA) 
is roughly as high as the Kyoto target and, therefore, the required carbon tax, or permit price, 
drops to close to zero USD/tC. The transfer of emission permits extends from the economies in 
transition EiT (the former Soviet Union and the middle and East European countries) to the EU, 
the pacific OECD countries and Canada. The revenues from trading would decrease close to zero 
in the Russian Federation and Ukraine as a result of the decrease in permit price. Other studies – 
as well as common economic sense – confirm these results. 
 
• Russia and Ukraine can be expected to be dominant sellers of emission permits in 2010. Russia 
and Ukraine have, therefore, strong incentives to act as oligopolies, if the US were not to partici-
pate and permit prices fall. The former Soviet Union countries could then decide to sell fewer cer-
tificates than in the competitive trading situation and increase the permit price from zero to a posi-
tive value. The potential revenues of the Annex 1 EIT countries are very sensitive to the permit 
price. Persson and Azar (2002) use an energy-economic optimisation model to estimate certificate 
permit prices and traded amounts. If no abatement policies are implemented in the former Soviet 
Union, these countries can still sell the difference between their reference CO2 emissions and their 
commitment (their “hot air”) – about 220 MtC/yr – but then the permit price would basically drop 
to zero. This would be the case if Russia and Ukraine would allocate emission rights to companies 
and if they would give allowance to the companies to sell the certificates internationally without 
any restrictions. 
 
However, Persson and Azar show that by oligopolistic behaviour, Russia and Ukraine would maxi-
mize their revenues by restricting the tradable certificates to an amount of 140 MtC/yr with a resulting 
certificate price of roughly 45 USD/tC. The resulting revenues are estimated to be approximately 6,3 
billion USD per year from 2008 to 2012. This presents approximately 15% of the revenues to the pre-
sent Russian national budget. If, however, the price would increase to above 75 USD/tC, there would 
be no economic incentive for European countries to purchase permits from the former Soviet Union. 
 
Table 1: Prices and amounts of CO2 with free trading and oligopoly, respectively 
 Free Trading Oligopoly 
Certificate prices Close to zero  12.3 – 20.5 USD/t CO2
Traded amounts 806.7 Mt CO2/yr 513.3 Mt CO2/yr 
 
2.1.3 Scenario: Emission Trade also with Japan and Australia 
This chapter will deal with the effects on the economies, prices and amounts of traded permits in the 
case that Japan takes part in the emission trade. Additionally, the chapter will give an impression on 
the possible effects of ratification by Australia, although in less detail. 
 
By still excluding the US from the agreement, the impacts of ratification by Japan have to be esti-
mated. As was stated in the preceding chapter, the “hot air” supply by the former Soviet Union is seen 
as sufficient to comply with the Kyoto commitments. Annex 1 countries can, without own reduction 
measures, meet their goals by buying Russian or Ukrainian certificates. The high supply of certificates 
in itself would result in prices not far above zero. Alas, even the minimal certificate prices pose an 
(however small) impact on the prices in the emission intensive industries and, therefore, impose 
drawbacks in international competitiveness in comparison to countries not bound by the protocol in 
their emission activities (like the USA). Studies dealing with the Japanese role thus concentrate on the 
possible impacts of a non-ratification by the US instead of dealing with the possible impacts of non-
compliance of Japan or other small countries. A notable study by Hamasaki (2001) deals solely with 
the comparison of the economic impacts on different world regions between two scenarios: compli-
ance or non-compliance with regard to the Kyoto protocol by the USA. While those effects are mod-
elled elaborately, there is no study available analysing the distinct economic consequences of a non-
ratification versus a ratification of the protocol by Japan. With Japan ratifying, the demand for certifi-
cates will be slightly higher as Japanese industries/companies seek to fulfil their reduction goals. With 
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higher demand, the traded amounts of certificates will rise (assuming that the former Soviet Union has 
enough “hot air” to sell) and the price might slightly increase. With a higher price of the emissions 
certificates, the economic impact of the Kyoto protocol reduction commitments will become more 
significant, but with further non-ratification of the US, those impacts might be less substantial than 
feared. However, if Japan had not signed the Treaty, the demand for certificates would have dropped 
even further and the impacts especially on the European economy might have lessened even more. 
Hamasaki (2001) analyses the impacts of the Kyoto ratification for different economic sectors.3 The 
impact of the ratification of the protocol and of taking part in emission trade by Japan on the EU on 
the emission price is not covered in the economic literature. It can be assumed that the demand for 
certificates will increase by 214.4 Mt CO2/yr as Japan’s emissions went up to 1,386.3 Mt in the year 
2000. Following Kyoto, Japan has to reduce its emissions to a level of 1,171.9 Mt CO2 in 2008-2012 
(cf.Table 2). Without Russian ratification, prices will probably increase while traded amounts will 
decrease due to lack of supply. 
 
Australia already stated that it would not ratify the protocol. The theoretical implication of ratification 
and the economic impacts can nevertheless be estimated. Although Australia was granted an increase 
in emissions, it seems feasible to assume that Australia would count to the demand side countries for 
emissions certificates. By joining the protocol, the price for certificates would, therefore, increase. As 
there is no easily available literature on economic impacts of ratification or non-ratification by Austra-
lia, we will not give quantitative estimations.  
Table 2: Demand for CO2 certificates in Japan 
 Free Trading 
Traded amounts Increased demand of 214.4 Mt CO2/yr 
 
2.1.4 Scenario: Inclusion of China resp. Some Developing Countries 
China poses a special issue and has to be analysed in more detail than, for example, Australia. As 
China is not one of the Annex 1 countries, it does not have a reduction commitment stemming from 
the initial protocol or succeeding COP agreements. However, China possesses a high reduction poten-
tial even considering the huge economic growth in the country and at the World Summit on Sustain-
able Development in Johannesburg, it announced to ratify the Kyoto protocol. With an outdated en-
ergy economic and power generating capacity with enormous emission intensities, China proves to be 
a highly interesting country for JI or CDM measures. The inclusion of non Annex 1 countries in inter-
national trading is another possibility to further lessen the costs of emissions abatement in the Annex 
1 countries. A study by Zhang (2001) investigates the impacts of different trading schemes by first 
considering a case where the Annex 1 countries must individually meet its Kyoto targets. The analysis 
then scrutinizes a scenario of Annex 1 trading and, finally, the case where also developing countries, 
including China, join in the emissions trading. In the following, the findings of the study are summa-
rised. To guarantee a comparability of the results, the scenarios of the study are reproduced. 
 
In the case of no emissions trading, marginal abatement costs are estimated which then represent do-
mestic prices of permits in 2010. The costs for the European Union presented in (Zhang 2001) are 
very low compared to estimates from (Ellerman and Decaux, 1998) or (MacCracken et al. 1999). 
Zhang reasons that official projections of baseline GHG emissions in 2010 by most EU member coun-
tries are very close to their respective targets. Thus, the EU only needs to take little additional abate-
ment actions to meet its target and leads to a very low marginal abatement cost in the EU. 
                                                     
3 Note that Hamasaki only considers the case of ratification or non-ratification of the US and does not elaborate on the ratifi-
cation or non-ratification of Japan itself. 
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Table 3: Autarkic marginal abatement costs in the no trading case and domestic prices and the interna-
tional price of permits in 2010 under the three trading scenarios (at 1998 US$/ton of carbon) 
Scenarios United 
States 
Japan European 
Union 
Other 
OECD 
Eastern 
Europe 
International 
Price 
No emissions trading 160.1 311.8 9.1 33.4 4.5 - 
Annex 1 trading* 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7 40.7 
Trading without 
China* 
18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 
Full global trading* 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 9.6 
* including the USA       
(Zhang 2001) 
 
Aside from the EU, non-emission trading scenario imposes very high abatement costs in the industri-
alised countries as was to be expected. Eastern Europe shows a very low marginal abatement cost as 
well, which is due to the amounts of “hot air” especially in the former Soviet Union. Annex 1 trading 
reduces the domestic certificate price for the US and Japan while it increases sharply in the EU and 
Eastern Europe. Broadening the trading market brings down the certificate’s price further, thereby 
generating benefits for highly industrialised countries. For the EU, Zhang expects higher costs in the 
case of Annex 1 trading compared to the autarky situation. The certificate costs reduce to near autarky 
levels only by inclusion of developing countries and China. 
 
It has to be noted that the inclusion of developing countries broadens the market for emissions rights, 
and the former Soviet Union will become worse off as the supply in certificates rises. The potential 
conflict of interest between the former Soviet Union and developing countries will become more im-
portant as the Kyoto process proceeds. However, an inclusion of developing countries and notably 
China with their supply of tradable emission rights into the protocol could provide additional incen-
tives for the USA to move back to Kyoto. The lower price of certificates by way of inclusion of China 
or other developing countries would satisfy domestic political requirements in the US and also allow 
the US to reap high benefits from a large joint emissions market where the permit price would be low 
(Carraro, 2002). By excluding the USA, prices would then drop considerably. 
 
 China Participates in Trad-
ing 
Developing Countries 
except China Partici-
pates 
Solely Annex 1 Trad-
ing 
Certificate prices 9.6 USD/t CO2 18.6 USD/t CO2 40.7 USD/t CO2  
Traded amounts ++ + 0 
++: highest; +: high; 0: baseline with full Annex 1 trading 
 
2.1.5 Participation or Non-Participation of the US 
The withdrawal of the US generated a strong interest in the quantitative and qualitative impacts of a 
Kyoto protocol without US participation. The government of countries, which ratified the Kyoto 
agreement or are in the process of committing their countries to the reduction targets fear for inequali-
ties for their competitiveness and the danger of inefficiency of the protocol itself. The refusal by 
President Bush to sign the protocol in order to protect the American economy will have a huge impact 
on the effects of the emissions certificates’ prices and traded amounts. The US rejection of Kyoto re-
moved by far the largest potential source of demand for emissions rights in the Kyoto system. The 
result is to leave a large potential supply by the economies in transition (esp. the former Soviet Union) 
set against a radically reduced demand. The impact on the price and traded amounts of emissions 
permit is, therefore, obvious: both will fall drastically. 
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Table 4 summarises the results of various economic modelling studies conducted since the US with-
drawal from Kyoto. Without exception, US withdrawal has a big impact in these models, which 
mostly assume a freely operating international trade in allowances and, in some cases, pushing the 
permit price close to zero. All models show at least a halving of the permit price in the case of non-
ratification by the US. The resulting certificate price ranges – depending on the study – from close to 
zero in the case of a non-ratification by the US up to 40.7 USD per ton CO2 (Zhang 2001). 
Table 4: International carbon prices from Economic models of the Kyoto system – US participation or 
withdrawal 
 Equilibrium Carbon Price, $/t CO2 Price Impact of US Withdrawal 
Model/Study With US Without US (Decline in %) 
Hagem and Holtsmark (2001) 15 5 66 
Eyckmans et al. (2001) 22 10 55 
Den Elzen and Manders 
(2001) 
37 13.6 63 
Böhringer (2001)  Close to zero 88-100* 
Babiker et al. (2002) 10 Negligible  
* depending on inclusion of carbon sinks 
 
Another study by Springer (2002) also shows resulting prices with values between zero and 12 
USD/tCO2, without giving an indication of the prices in the case of US compliance with Kyoto. 
Hamasaki (2001), which also analyses the sectorial economic impacts within the US, EU and Japan. 
Towards this end, Hamasakis model defines 10 sectors, mainly energy intensive industries (coal, oil, 
gas, electricity, etc.) with an additional agricultural and servicing sector and a regional aggregation of 
8 regions. The regions include amongst others the US, Japan, the EU, former Soviet Union and China. 
The results of the model are given in percentage changes of production output in each country (re-
gion). Table 5 gives an overview over some of the model results. 
Table 5: Model results; production output change in EU, Japan and the USA 
 Without US Ratification of the Protocol With US Ratification of the Protocol 
 JPN USA EU JPN USA EU 
COL -3.63 -2.03 -12.49 -9.26 -29.36 -16.96 
OMN -0.26 0.05 -0.39 -0.29 -0.69 -0.29 
AGR -0.25 0.08 -0.35 0.06 -1.99 0.06 
COL : Coal; OMN: metals nec, mineral products nec, paper products and publishing, other manufac-
turing, trade and transport; AGR: agriculture, forestry and fishing 
(Hamasaki, 2001) 
 
In the case that the US does not ratify the protocol, Table 5 shows an increase of the production in the 
US manufacturing industry while on the other hand, production in those sectors shrinks in Japan and 
the EU. The main reason is that the US industry does not have to bear additional expenses by the re-
duction of greenhouse gases. The EU and Japan have to meet their Kyoto targets and  will thus bear 
additional expenses and lose international competitiveness to those countries that have no emission 
reduction targets in place. Especially the US energy sector experiences huge benefits. In the case that 
the US ratifies the Kyoto protocol, the domestic energy consumption will have to decrease sharply; 
this is represented by the sharp decline in the coal sector. The EU competitiveness in terms of trade 
and manufacturing of other goods experiences some relief. Especially the agricultural sector benefits 
from US ratification. However, the rising price for tradable permits also burdens the EU energy sector 
more than in the case of non-ratification by the USA. With increased demand for certificates, the rela-
tively cheap (in the case of non-ratification by the US) supply from the former Soviet Union becomes 
increasingly more expensive. 
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Other model based calculations show expected permit prices under full global trading, including the 
USA to be between 1 and 25 €/tCO2 and under Annex I trading between 3 and 78 €/tCO2 (trading in-
cluding the US). Table 6 illustrates some of the model results. 
Table 6: Model based calculations for permit prices; acc. to Varilek & Marenzi, 2001 
Permit Prices in 2010 under full Global Trading (€/CO2)  incl. USA 
Rose 1 
POLES 7 
GEM E3 9 
MERGE 25 
Permit Prices in 2010 under Annex I trading (€/CO2) incl. USA 
Rose 3 
GEM E3 18 
Poles  19 
GREEN 20 
GTEM 40 
Oxford 78 
 
In general, the range in carbon prices in the models reflects the differences in presumptions made. 
Prices are affected by several factors including:  
• The stringency of caps placed on Annex I countries; 
• The limits on trading, such as supplementary requirements, fungibles; 
• Availability of JI and CDM projects for investment; 
• Number of players active in the market (i.e., will USA participate or not); 
• Technological options to reduce emissions; 
• GHG emissions development; 
• “Hot air” from Russia, Ukraine and other countries with economies in transition (CEIT’s) that 
are likely to have emissions in 2010 that are below their Kyoto targets. Thus, they may have a 
surplus of allowances. Other possible net sellers are the group of EU candidates in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
 
There are clearly considerable uncertainties involved in predicting future carbon prices, but prices are 
expected to stabilise as the institutional framework governing the mechanisms stabilises. These uncer-
tainties are reflected in the broad range of predicted prices for emission certificates throughout the 
literature. 
 US Non-Participation* US Participation* 
Certificate prices 0 – 13.6 USD/t CO2 10 – 40.7 USD/t CO2
*depending on study 
 
2.1.6 Conclusion: Price Development in Different Trading Environment 
The analysis of different participation schemes in the Kyoto process shows that ratification by addi-
tional countries beyond the EU has a significant impact on the prices and traded amounts of emissions 
rights. Especially a possible ratification by ‘big international players’ such as the former Soviet Union 
with their huge amount of “hot air”, or alternatively, the USA as the worldwide greatest emitter of 
greenhouse gases shows an enormous change in the international emissions right prices and traded 
amounts. Only with Russia and Ukraine ratifying the protocol can it come into force and, additionally, 
a supply of relatively cheap tradable certificates is guaranteed, i.e., as long as the former Soviet Union 
does not act as an oligopoly to maximise its profits.  
 
A participation of the US in the protocol is not to be expected after the clear withdrawal and the 
statement made by the current president, Mr. Bush. However, the non-participation does not only 
have the effect that the prices and amounts of traded emission rights decrease drastically. It also en-
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dangers the whole Kyoto protocol as the former Soviet Union countries are bereft of the expectedly 
best customer for certificates.  
 
Trading for the EU, which already submitted itself to following their Kyoto commitment, as was 
shown with the new directive on a European Trading Scheme – ETS – will commence in 2005. The 
possibility that the Kyoto protocol might not come into force or the different participation schemes of 
other countries only has one effect: how high will the costs of complying with their commitment be? 
Allowing for ratification and for the Kyoto protocol to come into force means that international trade 
with certificates might lessen the burden within the EU. Without US participation, there will be 
enough “hot air” and cheap certificates available as long as Russia and Ukraine ratify for the EU to 
fulfil its commitment. But if the former Soviet Union decides to follow the US example and not ratify 
the protocol, the costs of meeting the goals will inevitably rise. By including developing countries and 
especially China into the trading schemes means that the costs will decrease further; even if the US 
would overthrow their decision and decide to join. Even the high demand for certificates in the case of 
US participation can be satisfied at a relatively low price with the developing as part of the Annex 1 
trading. 
 
2.2 Tradable Green Certificates 
In the promotion of renewable energy technologies, the European Commission has launched a direc-
tive on the share of renewables in the individual member states in 2010, based on the percentage of 
each country’s consumption of electricity. Although not binding, it seems that these targets are by 
now accepted by the EU member states (European Commission, 2001). 
 
Within quite broad limits given by the EU, the Member States can today choose for themselves which 
support scheme to use in order to implement the above-mentioned renewable targets and among the 
EU member states opinions differ on which support system is the most efficient to be used. Germany, 
Spain and France have decided to stick to the well-tried feed-in tariff system for supporting their re-
newable technologies, while countries such as Sweden, Italy, the UK and Belgium have introduced 
tradable green certificate systems, although the certificate systems differ considerably in the way they 
are implemented in these countries. Thus, no common EU TGC-system seems to be underway within 
the next year. 
 
2.2.1 The TGC Approach 
A system of TGC’s can be characterised both as an accounting system to certify the electricity pro-
duction from renewable energy sources and as a regulatory instrument to ensure a politically planned 
deployment of renewable energy technologies. In a system of green certificates, the RE-producer sells 
electricity to the grid, and at the same time receives a certificate for each pre-defined unit of electri- 
city produced. Since electricity from RE and conventional production cannot be distinguished from 
one another, both are sold in the physical power market. The green certificates are financial assets and 
can be traded at a green market separated from the physical market and added to the revenue that the 
producer can receive for the electricity itself at the physical power market. Thus, the price obtainable 
to the RE-producer will be the sum of the market-based settling prices for physical power and green 
certificates.  
 
The demand for green certificates is driven by a politically determined goal for RE consumption, e.g., 
the national indicative targets. The demand for certificates is induced by transferring the national in-
dicative targets for RE to either the consumers and distribution companies or the supplier of electricity 
who will have to prove that they respectively consume or supply at least the specified amount of elec-
tricity produced from RE. In most countries, the obligation is imposed on the consumers and distribu-
tion companies, but in Italy, the obligation is imposed on every supplier of conventional energy, who 
is required to ensure that 2% of the electricity delivered to the grid is produced from RE. Hence, the 
suppliers will have to install new RE-capacity or buying certificates and in the remaining, suppliers of 
energy are also referred to as consumers of green certificates.  
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2.2.2 Minimum and Maximum Prices 
In order to reach the goal of RE, the TGC scheme often contains a penalty for consumers who are fail-
ing to fulfil their targets (e.g., buying the minimum required certificates). In this way, national gov-
ernments signal the maximum price they are willing to force unto consumers to pay for the deploy-
ment of renewable energy sources. Thus, if the market-based price of TGC’s exceeds the penalty, the 
consumers will prefer to pay the penalty instead of TGC’s. Likewise, the penalty also sets out the 
maximum price to the owners of RE generation technologies as it functions as a price cap for the 
TGC’s. In order to provide more certainty for investments in new RE-capacities, some TGC schemes 
also operate with a minimum price that ensures sellers of TGC’s to receive at least a minimal addi-
tional income from the green certificates. Thus, the minimum price thereby works to reduce the 
downward pressure on TGC prices in years with excess supply.  
 
If an international market for TGC’s is established, different national price-caps will converge into 
one. With different national maximum and minimum prices, TGC’s will be traded at prices below the 
lowest penalty and above the highest minimum price. At present, Belgium (the Flanders region), 
Denmark, Italy, Sweden and probably also the UK have introduced or are planning to introduce a 
price-cap on the TGC market (Nielsen and Jeppesen, 2003). 
 
2.2.3 Validity of Certificates 
One important issue in order to establish a common market of TGC in the EU is the validity of certifi-
cates. In Italy, the green certificates are valid for the reference year only while in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, the green certificates have no date of expiry. This implies that Danish and Dutch suppli-
ers of green certificates can withhold certificates in years with excess supply and low prices and sell 
them in years with a supply shortage and higher prices. Likewise, consumers can buy certificates in 
years with excess supply and low prices and use them in years with low supply. Consequently, differ-
ent certificate validities will restrict trade of TGC’s in an international market because different peri-
ods of validity cannot co-exist.  
 
2.2.4 Tradability of Green Certificates  
Another important issue to take into consideration in the discussion of TGC’s is the tradability of 
green certificates from the different national TGC systems. One of the ideas behind the TGC approach 
is to place investments in new renewable energy sources where it is most profitable in order to ensure 
cost efficiency. Thus, to increase cost-efficiency, the market of green certificates should cover as 
many different types of renewable energy generation, e.g., electricity, gas, and heat, and also different 
types of RE-technologies. Whether the green certificates should only be subject to new RE-capacities 
or also include existing energy production from RE technologies is, however, a question of the pur-
pose of the TGC-scheme. If the purpose is to increase the installation of new RE capacity, the existing 
capacity should not be included as it can be argued that once installed and financed, the existing RE-
capacity is already competitive without the extra financial compensation from the certificate.  
 
A comparative analysis of six national systems of TGC in Europe by Nielsen and Jeppesen (2003) 
shows that the main focus is on electricity generation, while generation of heat and gas is only in-
cluded in Belgium (the Flanders region) and the Netherlands. Also, the national definition of RE tech-
nologies approved for green certificates is another aspect where the countries differ. In the UK and 
Denmark it has been decided to exclude large hydropower plants from certification and in the Nether-
lands, Germany, the Flanders region, and Denmark, non-organic waste is to be excluded. Further-
more, in Italy, it has been decided that existing plants (with a few exceptions) are ineligible for certifi-
cation and that new plants receive certificates for the first 8 years of production only. Contrary to this 
are the Flanders region and the Netherlands, where existing plants are eligible for certification along 
with new plants. 
 
In order to establish a common market of TGC in the EU and to trade green certificates across bor-
ders, the different countries must agree on a common definition of certified technologies and which 
sectors to include in the system.  
Risø-R-1470 (EN)  17 
3 TEP Influence at the “Joint” Market Bidding 
 
In this chapter, the main characteristics of a tradable emission permit approach will be outlined and 
the implications of a TEP-scheme on the systems simulations in the Wilmar model will be discussed.  
 
The major characteristics of a CO2 emission-trading scheme are: 
 
• A cap is set on the total emissions of all participants in the scheme by allocating a certain amount 
of emission permits, which is fixed ex ante for a certain period. The permits are tradable and can 
be freely traded among the participants; 
• Participants are obliged to surrender a quantity of permits equal to their emissions over a certain 
period. A surplus of permits can be sold (or banked), while a deficit has to be covered by purchas-
ing additional permits (or paying a penalty); 
• The obligation to surrender permits is imposed on the generators of electricity using fossil fuels. 
 
3.1 Bidding at the Spot Market 
The Nord Pool Elspot market is a day-ahead physical-delivery power market where the price of power 
is based on supply and demand. The products traded on the Elspot Market are bids of a one-hour dura-
tion, block bids and flexible hourly bids and the deadline for submitting bids for the following day’s 
delivery hours are 12 noon. For each hour, the market clears (equalises supply with demand) and the 
price is determined at spot market. If there are no limitations of transmission within the market, the 
spot price will be the same in all areas.   
 
In theory, the supply of power at the spot market is determined by the marginal costs of power pro-
duction. Typically, the bids from hydro and wind power enter the supply curves at the lowest level, 
due to their low marginal costs, while bids from conventional condensing power plants have the high-
est marginal costs and enter at the high end of the supply curve.  
 
Power producers will generate electricity when the spot price is highest and cover the marginal costs 
of power production. Hence, in periods with high demand, the power producers will try to maximise 
production. In principle, all power producers can trade at the Nord Pool exchange market, but in real-
ity only large producers act on the market. In Denmark, the Transmission System Operators (TSO) is 
obligated to buy all electricity produced from renewable energy and decentralised CHP (priority dis-
patch). The Wind producers are paid a feed-in tariff for everything they produce and decentralised 
CHP are paid according to a three-level tariff and this implies that these producers do not react on the 
price signals from the spot market. 
 
3.2 Influence of TEP on the Spot Price 
The CO2 emission-trading system that is to be launched in the EU may have a significant impact on 
the price of electricity as all producers of electricity based on fossil fuels may face additional costs of 
purchasing emission permits. In order to stay within their specified quota, they will be faced by higher 
marginal cost of power production because they will either have to carry out measures to abate CO2 
emissions or buy permits to cover their emissions. Thus, the influence of an emission-trading system 
in EU on the spot price will depend on the allocation of permits for the electricity sector and the prices 
of TEP. 
 
3.2.1 Allocation of Permits on the Electricity Sector 
The amount of permits allocated for the electricity sector is a crucial factor in order to estimate the 
influence of the CO2 emission trading on the spot price of electricity. Consequently, if producers of 
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electricity are only given small amounts of emission permits, they are forced to buy more permits than 
if they were given a greater amount.  
 
The EU directive on CO2 emission trading states that 95% of the permits must be allocated for free in 
the first period from 2005-2007. The directive also states that the amount of permits must be in accor-
dance with the national targets of the Kyoto protocol in each member states. However, the actual 
amount and allocation of permits are a matter for the individual member states.  
 
At present, several countries have submitted their national allocation plans of emission permits to the 
EU. In general, the allocation of emission permits is based on the principle of grandfathering, e.g., 
historical emissions. In the EU, approximately 95% of CO2 emissions originate from fossil fuel com-
bustions and the energy sector is, therefore, in particular subject to the allocation of emission permits.  
 
3.2.2 TEP Prices 
The influence of a EU emission-trading system on the spot price of electricity will be highly depend-
ent on the market price of TEP. As described in the previous chapter, a great uncertainty is connected 
to the expected prices of TEP’s that range from close to zero up to 270 USD per ton CO2. Conse-
quently, the influence of the TEP costs at the spot price will be less in an emission-trading scheme 
that is open to international trade than a scheme that only includes the EU.  
 
In a study by Hindsberger et al. (2003), the consequences of different CO2 emission limits on the spot 
price in the four Nordic countries has been analysed. The results show that a low CO2 emission quota 
(TGC1), for example, to the four countries’ targets in the Kyoto protocol, the spot price will increase 
from the present level with up to about 50% in 2010. As shown in Figure 3, the highest prices will 
appear in Denmark and Finland and the lowest in Norway and Sweden.  
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Figure 3: Annual weighted average spot prices 2010. 
In respect of the producers’ surplus, the picture is complicated. The surplus gained by the owner of a 
particular production unit depends on the cost of production (and for new investments also on invest-
ment costs) and on the price of TEP’s. For production units with emissions, the relevant prices are the 
spot price and the TEP price, and for production units that have no emissions (e.g., renewable energy), 
the relevant price is the spot price only. Hence, the various types of production technology will be 
quite differently affected as illustrated in Figure 4. The graph, which refers to the situation in Sweden, 
shows the variable production costs for different types of technology in two cases: no emission limita-
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tion (TEP0) and maximum emission limitation (TEP1). Since the cost of acquiring the necessary 
TEP’s associated with production is internalised into the electricity production cost, the cost will in-
crease for the production types that have emissions.  
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Figure 4: Variable production costs with and without CO2 emission limits in Sweden. 
The figure also shows the electricity spot price in Sweden with and without the CO2 emission limits. 
As seen, the variations on the spot price imply that some of the technology types may change the 
situation from earning money to losing money, even though the increasing spot price is shown as the 
dotted horizontal lines. Heavy restrictions on emissions penalise the fossil-fuelled technologies sig-
nificantly, and the associated increase in the spot price does not compensate for this. For non-emitting 
technologies (renewable and nuclear), the cost is not affected by emission limitations, but the income 
is.  
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4 TGC Influence on the “Joint” Market Bidding 
 
In this chapter, the main characteristics of a Green Certificate approach will be outlined and the impli-
cations of a TGC scheme on the systems’ simulations in the Wilmar model are discussed.  
 
4.1 The Green Certificate Market – the Long Term Concept 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the idea of a TGC approach is to use market forces to determine the  
necessary additional payment to investors in renewable plants. Thus, at the core of the TGC market is 
a certification of all renewable produced energy and an obligation to buy these certificates (Morthorst 
2000 and 2003 a): 
 
• All renewable energy technologies, including wind power, biomass and biogas plants, photovol-
taics, geothermal and small hydro plants, are certified for producing green electricity. The owners 
will receive a green certificate per unit of electricity produced (per MWh);  
• Producers or consumers of electricity are obliged to buy a certain share of their production or con-
sumption as electricity generated by renewable energy technologies. Buying the above-mentioned 
green certificates from the owners of renewable technologies can fulfil this obligation; 
• The Energy Authorities will determine this share (quota), presumably for a number of years in 
advance. At the end of each year, a volume of TGC’s corresponding to the quota will be with-
drawn from the market by the authorities;  
• If the actors at the market cannot fulfil their quota-responsibilities, penalties have to be paid for 
the deficits of certificates. 
 
The green certificates will be supplied to the market, partly by already existing renewable plants, i.e., 
plants established before the considered timescale, and partly by newly established ones. At the core 
of the certificate market, approach is a regulated development of new renewable capacity. Thus, it is 
important that the quota is set in such a way that after subtracting the supply of certificates by existing 
renewable plants from the given quota, it should then be possible to cover the residual demand for 
certificates in the given timescale by newly established capacity. The increases in quotas over time 
will have significant impacts upon the expected future price of certificates, which are of utmost im-
portance for potential new investors in renewable capacity. 
 
The long-run marginal cost of renewable produced electricity is the core in the long-run supply of cer-
tificates, where the long-run marginal cost is defined as the cost per unit of energy produced (per 
kWh) over the lifetime of the plant, taking into account all the relevant costing issues. Parameters 
paramount to the decision for establishing a new renewable plant include investment costs, fuel costs, 
O&M costs, the expected lifetime of the plant and its electricity production and, finally, an appropri-
ate risk premium. The risk premium will to a certain extent depend on technological risk factors as the 
expected availability of the plant, but most importantly will be economic factors as the expected fu-
ture production costs of new renewable plants. 
 
The determination of the expected long-run equilibrium price for the green certificates is shown in 
Figure 5. The supply from existing renewable plants covers part of the predetermined demand for cer-
tificates (the quota) and those plants expected to be established in the previous period has to cover the 
residual part to fulfil the quota. The expected long-run equilibrium price for the development of new 
renewable capacity (Pe) is determined by the intersection of the expected long-run marginal cost curve 
for new capacity and the vertical demand line (the quota). As shown in Figure 5, this long-run equilib-
rium price is divided into a part covered by the spot market price of power and a residual part to be 
covered by the price of the green certificates. Pe is the starting point for the short-run supply curve. If 
short-term conditions are in accordance with the expected long-term development, the short-run price 
of certificates will be equal to the long-run equilibrium price. But if short and long-term conditions 
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differ (e.g., if produced electricity by existing plants falls short of expected production, which will 
shift the short-run supply curve inwards), the short-run price of certificates will be different from the 
one given by the long-run equilibrium.4
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Figure 5: Price determination and the relation between long and short-run in a green certificate market. 
 
A number of reasons might exist for why the long-term equilibrium would not be fulfilled, among 
these is most importantly that the amount of generated electricity would differ from the expected pro-
duction. In that case, the supply of certificates is determined by the short-run supply curve, as shown 
in Figure 5. The shape and slope of this supply curve will be determined by short-run considerations; 
among these are the suppliers’ willingness or aversions to risk, their individual economic situation and 
expectations to the size of the quota compared to the expected power production. Until now, experi-
ences with green certificate markets using the obligatory quota concept are limited and, therefore, it is 
difficult a priori to determine the shape of the short-run supply curve. 
 
The income to owners of renewable plants will consist of two parts: one part from the sale of the elec-
tricity produced to the spot market and one from the sale of green certificates. The two parts will be 
traded at two separate markets and the financial certificate market will in principle be totally separated 
from the physical electricity market. Therefore, for potentially new renewable plant owners, not only 
the green certificate market will be relevant, but the physical spot market for electricity will be impor-
tant as well. Price-determination at the TGC market is expected to be closely-related to the price at the 
power spot market. The potential wind turbine owners will have expectations to the total price paid 
for the energy produced, i.e., for the price of electricity at the spot market plus the price per kWh ob-
tained at the green certificate market. The following parameters are the most important ones in deter-
mining the future green certificate prices: 
 
• Spot Price: If the spot market price is low, this will increase expectations to the price of green 
certificates, while if the spot price is high, a lower price of green certificates might be accepted;  
• Certificate Quotas: If the quotas state a rapid development of new renewable capacity, this tends 
to raise the certificate-price – in a similar way, a slow development of the quotas will tend to 
lower the certificate –price; 
• Technological Development: A rapid development of renewable technologies tends to lower the 
certificate price; correspondingly, a slow development will give a higher certificate price. 
 
The last mentioned issue implies that efficiency improvements of new renewable energy technologies 
will directly show up as lower TGC prices and, therefore,  result in a lower payment to the owners of 
renewable plants. Thus, due to the strong connections between improved efficiencies of new renew-
able plants and the long-run TGC price, the TGC market should in principle make itself redundant in 
                                                     
4 The short-run supply curve in Figure 1 is drawn given the assumption that the validity of certificates is eternal. If the valid-
ity were limited to, for example, one year, the curve would look much different. 
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the long-term (Morthorst 2002). To show how this influences the development of the TGC price over 
time, the results of an illustrative simulation with a TGC market model is shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Simulating TGC price developments in cases with different technological development (different 
efficiency improvements) assuming an upper and a lower price limit. 
 
The starting point for the simulation is the “no efficiency improvement” case. In this case, the simula-
tion is adjusted5 to follow a path of almost constant TGC prices – the small ups and downs could be 
removed by a closer fine-tuning of the model, but has no influence on the results. Observe that an up-
per and lower limit of the TGC price is assumed as in the Danish TGC approach. If energy production 
efficiency improvements of new renewable plants are assumed, significant reductions in the TGC 
prices show up as the result. An annual efficiency increase of 2% for new plants would as a result im-
ply that the TGC price would hit the lower limit after approximately 20 years6. If an efficiency im-
provement of 1% p.a. were combined with a 1% p.a. decrease in investment cost, the results would be 
slightly more positive, because investment costs are reduced up-front.  
 
4.1.1 The Implications of a TGC Market for the Simulations in Wilmar 
As mentioned above, the core in the TGC system is to drive new investments into renewable energy 
technologies. Normally, the TGC market is modelled as an annual equilibrium market, where the 
growth in renewable capacity is equivalent to the increase in the stipulated certificate quota and the 
TGC price is determined by the corresponding long-term marginal cost of the renewable technologies 
minus the power spot price. Thus, the modelled TGC price is an equilibrium price, where neither 
shortage nor deficits exist in the TGC market. 
 
Wilmar is an hourly-based annual model that does not determine investments in new plants endoge-
nously (Meibom et al., 2003). Because there is no need to determine investments in renewables, there 
                                                     
5 By adjusting the TGC-quota. 
6 Assuming that no other barriers would restrict the renewable development. 
Risø-R-1470 (EN)  23 
will be no explicit function of a TGC system in this model, except that the existence of a TGC market 
might influence the simulations of the power system in Wilmar. Thus, Wilmar is influenced in two 
ways by a TGC system: 
 
1. Because a larger capacity of renewable technologies is established, the amount of renewable en-
ergy produced may be increased and more supplied to the power exchange. This will not only 
have an impact on power price, but might also influence the technical functioning of the system, 
for instance, due to congestions of power transmission lines; 
2. Owing to the existence of the TGC price, the bidding price of renewable plants into the power 
exchange might be lower than their marginal costs. Thus, the TGC price might influence the strat-
egy of bidding of the renewable energy producers and, therefore, also the timing of the renewable 
energy produced. 
 
These two issues can be taken into account in Wilmar, either by exogenously determining a TGC 
price and the increases in renewable energy produced or by developing a module to Wilmar that on a 
one-year basis models the consequences of a TGC system.  
 
Thus, if a EU wide TGC system was a relevant alternative to investigate, it would be appropriate to 
exogenously determine the volume of renewable energy produced and the corresponding TGC price, 
because a major part of the TGC system would anyway reside outside the Wilmar model. This would 
be the most simplistic way to introduce the TGC market, only implying the exogenously determined 
supply of renewable produced energy and the adjustment of marginal costs for the relevant renewable 
technologies. 
 
If only a TGC system restricted to those countries modelled in Wilmar7 were considered, the above-
mentioned exogenous approach could still be used, but it could be relevant to develop a separate 
module modelling a one-year TGC market in Wilmar. This module includes long-term supply func-
tions for the most relevant renewable technologies (wind power, biomass and biogas plants, photovol-
taics, geothermal and small hydro plants) and the stipulated development in the national quotas of cer-
tificates. The module determines the long-term marginal cost of renewable development correspond-
ing to the certificate quota, and, thus, by subtracting the power spot price, implicitly the TGC price.  
 
Nevertheless, the above-mentioned TGC module would still handle the TGC market in a simplistic 
manner. A more satisfactorily way of modelling the TGC system is to develop a comprehensive 
multi-annual model, which over time takes into account how the TGC market develops, including 
quotas, technologies, price expectations, etc. Moreover, the stochastic intermittencies of wind power 
and photovoltaics power production might have a significant influence on the TGC price, implying 
the need to also introduce banking and borrowing in the model. But an advanced model like this one 
seems not only to be out of scope for handling the interplay with Wilmar, but also such a TGC mod-
ule would be incompatible with the hourly simulation model. 
 
4.2 The Green Certificate Market – The Short-Term  
Wilmar performs a detailed hourly simulation of the power system, including renewables as wind 
power. This simulation will run basically for one year, but by linking the individual years will, of 
course, mean that a series of years can be handled. In order to obtain a short-term interplay with the 
TGC market right, this means that information about the TGC price should be available for each hour 
of the year in question. This raises two fundamental problems in relation to the TGC market: 
 
• A TGC market normally only has a binding obligation by the end of the year. This means that 
although the certificates may be traded throughout the year, this trade could in reality be carried 
                                                     
7 Or perhaps only one or a few of the countries modelled in Wilmar. 
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out just before closing the annual market, implying that no information is available during the 
year; 
• Although trade does take place during the year, there is no explicit demand or supply functions, 
which are specifically used on an hourly basis. Therefore, what makes actors trade will be a mix-
ture of expectations (among other issues’ expectations to the supply of certificates and to the spot 
price of power), strategy and willingness to speculate (risk takers or risk averse). 
 
Owing to these two issues, it will be difficult, if not irrelevant, to model a TGC price on an hourly 
basis. It is, therefore, suggested to use the long-term TGC price (estimated as an annual average) as 
the hourly price for TGC’s. This average could eventually be adjusted by a stochastic factor, deter-
mining a certain random variation of the TGC price on an hourly basis. 
 
4.3 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Quite a number of Member States within the EU such as Sweden, Italy, the UK and Belgium have 
introduced tradable green certificate systems. The certificate systems applied in these countries differ 
considerably in the way they are implemented and cannot be converted directly into a harmonised EU 
scheme. Therefore, no common EU TGC system seems to be underway within the next year. 
 
The idea of a TGC approach is to use market forces to determine the necessary additional payment to 
investors in renewable plants. Thus, at the core of the TGC market is a certification of all renewable 
produced energy and an obligation to buy these certificates. The main intention of the TGC system is 
to drive forward new investments in renewable energy technologies.  
 
In relation to the Wilmar-model, a TGC market influence the modelling in two ways: 1) A TGC mar-
ket drives forward more renewable capacity than would have been the case without the market. Thus, 
more renewable produced energy is supplied to the power exchange. 2) Owing to the revenues from 
the certificates, the owners of renewable plants might lower their bids to the power exchange below 
their marginal costs. This might also influence the operation of these plants. In both cases, the simula-
tions of the power system in Wilmar will be affected. 
 
In the Wilmar-model, the TGC market can either be handled exogenously, i.e., the increase in renew-
able capacity and an average annual TGC price is determined outside the model, or a simple TGC 
module is developed, including the long-term supply functions for the most relevant renewable tech-
nologies and an overall TGC quota. Both solutions are rather simple, but to develop a more advanced 
model for the TGC market seems to be out of scope for handling the interplay with the  
Wilmar-model.  
 
The obligation for the TGC market is normally given on an annual basis, i.e., the certificate quota has 
to be fulfilled within a given year. This implies that to establish a TGC price on an hourly basis 
throughout the year is not only difficult, but also irrelevant. Therefore, it is suggested to use the long-
term annual average TGC price, eventually adjusted by a stochastic factor as the hourly based TGC 
price to be used in Wilmar.  
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5 Influence of Interaction between TEP’s and TGC’s at the 
“Joint” Market Bidding 
 
In this chapter, we examine some of the effects of the interaction between a market for emission trad-
ing and green certificates on the bidding at the physical power market. The chapter describes some of 
the consequences of implementing two parallel markets of TEP’s and TGC’s into a liberalised power 
market.  
 
Although an emission trading system and a market for green certificates for renewable electricity are 
focused on different target groups, there is an overlap between the objectives of these instruments. 
Both instruments are aimed at promoting electricity produced from RE although the primary aim of 
emission trading system is to reduce CO2 emissions and thereby indirectly encourage the saving of 
fossil fuel use in general and in particular the switch to renewable energy. Thus, deploying renewable 
power production is one option for the power companies in fulfilling their CO2 reduction targets and 
complying with their TEP quotas.   
  
In the study by Hindsberger et al. (2003), the interactions of an international green certificate market 
and a tradable permits market in combination of a liberalised electricity market is analysed in relation 
to countries in the Baltic Sea Region. The study has addressed a situation where goals for limitations 
on CO2 emissions and/or introduction of renewable energy have been implemented through the estab-
lishment of international systems of exchange of TEP’s and/or TGC’s. Thus, it is assumed that one or 
two international markets have been established in addition to the electricity market. The situation has 
been explicitly modelled at two abstraction levels, one suitable for defining and analysing basic func-
tionalities and one (the Balmorel model, www.balmorel.com) suitable for numerical analysis in rela-
tion to countries in the Baltic Sea Region. The Balmorel model was taken as starting point for the 
Wilmar model and the results from the two models are, therefore, comparable. The numerical simula-
tions contribute an estimate of the TEP and TGC prices and spot price electricity in the region de-
pending on the assumptions regarding target setting for renewable energy and emission limitation.  
 
The general conclusion is that within the range of goals stipulated in the EU draft directive (23.6% 
renewable energy) and the Kyoto targets for emissions, prices are affected significantly: from –2 to 
+10 EUR00/MWh for electricity spot prices, TGC prices up to 50 EUR00/MWh, TEP prices up to 
18EUR00/t CO2 and up to +15 EUR00/MWh on the consumer costs. This estimated increase will re-
sult in increased consumers’ cost of electricity in the Nordic countries of up to 6 billion EURO annu-
ally and have important consequences for the production and investment patterns in the electricity 
sector. Thus, unlike before, when the location of production capacity was determined to a large extent 
by national energy self-sufficiency, the motivation for establishing new production technology is now 
also determined by international arrangements in relation to renewable energy and emission limita-
tions.  
 
As a result of the study, an immediate consequence is increased pressure on transmission lines. The 
transmission quantities indicated in the analysis will clearly motivate or force investments in in-
creased international transmission capacity. If this does not take place and result in a segmentation of 
the electricity spot market, some of the efficiency gains, which are the motivation for the introduction 
of TEP and TGC markets, will be lost. There are other perspectives of the restructuring of the electri-
city system that may result from the introduction of TEP and TGC markets. Thus, a significant in-
crease in wind power will have to be counterbalanced by measures such as access to production tech-
nologies with fast regulating properties and/or that may maintain voltage stability. However, one con-
sequence of the pursuit of a renewable energy goal is to reduce the spot price of electricity - therefore, 
the motivation for investments in traditional technologies with such desirable qualities will be lower. 
In other words, the price signals of TGC’s (and to some extent also TEP’s) that will enhance wind 
26  Risø-R-1470 (EN) 
power investments will simultaneously hamper investments in technologies that are a precondition for 
extensive use of wind power technologies. 
 
In a study by Morthorst (2003 b), the interactions of an international green certificate market and a 
tradable permits market in combination into a liberalised electricity market is analysed with a three-
country model. The main assumptions for the model are the following:  
 
• All three countries are all part of the same physical electricity market and there are no barriers for 
export/import of electricity between the countries;  
• All power production from renewables is assumed to be sold at the physical electricity market, no 
matter what the spot market price turns out to be;  
• All countries are assumed to have committed themselves to national GHG reduction targets and 
no emission-adjustments are allowed with regard to export/import of electricity;  
• All countries have accepted the same rules for TGC trading and thus trade-in certificates flows 
freely across the borders and no GHG credits are attached to the green certificates;  
• All countries are assumed to have accepted the same rules for TEP trading and trade-in tradable 
permits flows freely across the borders. 
 
The study shows that a combination of an international tradable permits market and a green certificate 
market is seen to be efficient in contributing to achieving the national CO2 reduction targets if a close 
co-ordination of the two instruments is undertaken at least at the national level. When power produc-
tion from RE is increased, the quota of TEP should be decreased correspondingly. Otherwise, the ex-
pected CO2 reductions will not fully contribute to achieving the national targets for greenhouse gas 
reductions. Thus, if it is a prerequisite that renewable power contributes to achieving national GHG 
reduction targets, then the combination of these two markets might be the right solution.  
 
A main conclusion from this study is that neither the use of national renewable support schemes nor 
the introduction of a TGC market into a liberalised power market can be recommended, if these initia-
tives efficiently are expected to contribute to achieving the national CO2 reduction targets. Thus, the 
most ambitious countries in implementing renewable energy technologies will only partly gain the 
CO2 reduction benefits themselves while less ambitious ones also achieve the benefits of this. In the 
case of a TGC –market, the most ambitious countries to fulfil their TGC quotas will have to buy cer-
tificates from the less ambitious ones, although this only contributes to fulfilling a national target for 
renewable development, not in reaching their national CO2 reduction targets (this problem of not gain-
ing the full CO2 benefit of a national implementation of renewable power is not only related to green 
certificate markets, but is generally in character if the country takes part in a liberalised power mar-
ket). 
 
One solution to solve this problem is to combine the TGC market with a market for TEP’s. In the case 
of a combined green certificate system and a tradable permits market, it is necessary  that the quotas 
of the two markets are adjusted in a co-ordinated manner: When the green power production is in-
creased, the tradable permits quota should be decreased correspondingly. The expected CO2 reduc-
tions will otherwise not contribute by the full value in achieving the national targets for greenhouse 
gas reductions. Although this requires a strong co-ordination of these policy instruments, it might 
show the necessary way forward if renewable power is to contribute significantly to achieving the 
national emission reduction targets.  
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6 Implications for Implementation in WILMAR 
 
The above chapters have described TEP and TGC concepts and markets. This chapter will describe 
the possibilities for modelling TEP and TGC aspects in the Wilmar model.  
 
In the Wilmar model, there are three basic timescales or time horizons for the decision-making by the 
actors on the market: a one-hour horizon, applicable to the regulating power market; a one-day hori-
zon, applicable to the spot market bidding; and a one-year (or longer) horizon, applicable to the de-
termination of use of regulated hydropower.  
 
The first two time horizons are treated together in the so-called joint market model. This implies in 
particular that the decision-making related to bidding is treated as an integrated process for the two 
time horizons. The market clearing and the determination of prices and quantities will on the assump-
tion that the electricity market is perfect, admit no possibility of arbitrage between the two markets. 
We shall also in the sequel refer to the joint market as the short-term market.  
 
In principle, something similar could be said about the relations with the third (one-year) time hori-
zon. However, in practice, the third time horizon is much longer than any of the two others, and for 
this reason, the treatment in the Wilmar modelling context differs. The longer-term aspects are treated 
in the so-called long-term model. The interaction between the joint market model and the long-term 
model will be taken care of in the Wilmar model, but as concerns model details, these will be in a less 
integrated manner than the interaction between the spot and the regulating markets.  
 
Seen from the point of view of the joint market model, the long-term model requirement is that it must 
provide boundary conditions for the joint market model. The primary goal in this respect is to do so 
for hydropower. The necessity of this is that the hydropower storages permit the use of hydropower 
throughout the whole year, even if hydropower inflow is out of phase with the electricity consump-
tion. This is in contrast to wind power, which is not immediately storable.  
 
For a long-term power model with a mixture of different production technologies, this amounts to 
solving a stochastic optimisation problem in order to find what is traditionally called water values, 
i.e., the expected marginal benefit of having one MWh of electricity stored in the form of water in a 
reservoir.  
 
Once the water values are calculated in a long-term model, they may be used in a short-term model to 
provide the required boundary conditions in order to make an optimal economic dispatch.  
 
However, there is also a connection from the short-term model to the long-term model. The water 
values can only be derived from the long-term model based on the cost structure assumptions in the 
short-term model, because the water values must essentially be equal to the expected marginal cost in 
the short-term model. Furthermore, from the simulation of the shorter chronological timescales  
throughout the year, the accumulated use of hydropower will be found, which is used in the updating 
of the hydro reservoir contents.  
 
As appears from the previous chapters, the determination of the prices of TEP and TGC must be char-
acterised as a long-term issue. For TEP and TGC, there are, therefore, similar aspects that connect 
short-term and long-term aspects. This will be discussed in the following. 
 
6.1 Short-Term Aspects - Joint Market Operation 
For the benefit of the following, discussion production units may be classified into units that are ca-
pacity (power) constrained and units that are energy constrained. Let us first treat the capacity con-
strained units.  
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The decision of whether to bid a given quantity of electricity into the short-term market (spot and/or 
regulating – cf. the joint market concept in Wilmar) is based on a comparison between the marginal 
cost of production and the expected electricity price. Assuming perfect competition, the whole capac-
ity should ideally be bid into the market; the question is only at which price.  
 
The price to be used for bidding is the net marginal cost, i.e., the marginal cost minus any marginal 
income. The marginal cost will be assumed known. However, in the short-term perspective, the mar-
ginal income need not be known, at least not with certainty.  
 
If there is only one market with which there is no difficulty. However, there may be more than one 
relevant market. Thus, with a TGC market, the operator of, for example, a biomass-fuelled unit faces 
two distinct types of markets: one for TGC and another for spot and regulating electricity (i.e., short-
term markets in the above terminology). If the price in one market, e.g., the TGC price, were known, 
the relevant price to use for bidding on the other, the spot market, would be the marginal operation 
cost minus the TGC price. But the TGC price cannot be known from the operation of the short-term 
markets, and it will have to be introduced endogenously.   
 
Similar considerations apply to the TEP. In order that the net marginal cost of, for example, a gas 
fired production unit may be known, the TEP price must be know. However, the TEP price is deter-
mined in a longer perspective, related to annual emission quotas.   
 
Given the two prices, for TEP and for TGC, the solution of the short-term market problem, as per-
formed in the Wilmar joint market model, will be no more complicated than in a system without TEP 
and TGC. The only slight complication is that a data element must be kept, which represents the TEP 
and the TGC price and that these have to be incorporated into the net marginal cost calculation. The 
result of the market clearing will be different, due to the different magnitudes with which the TEP and 
TGC prices affect the marginal cost on the different units. 
 
If the fuel efficiency of a unit is constant, then the net marginal cost may be calculated as a fixed 
number (for given cost components). If fuel efficiency depends on the production level, then the dif-
ferent component in the determination of the net marginal cost will contribute in non-constant propor-
tions. If, for example, the fuel efficiency of a gas fired unit has a maximum at 80% of full load, then 
increasing electricity output to 90% of full load in a given hour will increase the income from electric-
ity sales by 12.5%. But the fuel cost will increase more, and so will the cost of acquiring TEP, which 
matches the increased emission.  
 
As concerns energy constrained units, e.g., small hydro, the situation is somewhat similar. Again, the 
net marginal cost is a relevant issue for the determination of bidding. However, in addition, the water 
value must be taken into consideration, i.e., the expected value of the stored water.  
 
Furthermore, if the efficiency is not a constant, but depends on the power output, this must be taken 
into consideration. For example, operating at the most efficient point may permit the production of 
100 MWh of electricity from a certain amount of water, but operating at a lower efficiency may per-
mit only 90 MWh from the same amount of water. This will imply a reduction in the sale of TGC of 
10%. This loss has to be balanced against the potential increase of net income from increased sale of 
electricity in peak price hours and decreased sale in low price hours.  
 
The conclusion for the implementation in the WILMAR joint market model is that the TEP market 
will be implemented using an endogenously given TEP price. This price can either come from the 
long-term model, see below, of may be assumed from consideration of, for example, world market 
prices for TEP.  
 
Whether the TGC will be implemented in the WILMAR joint market model is not yet decided. As 
appears from the previous discussion, it seems less relevant for the short-tem operational issues. Fur-
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thermore, it will depend in part on the way the short-term energy and power issues of hydro will be 
modelled, since this will determine the possibilities of inclusion of TGC.  
 
6.2 Long-Term Aspects – The Long-Term Model   
The main functioning of the long-term model in relation to hydropower long-term scheduling is to 
provide water values on a feedback form, viz., for any particular time of the year (e.g., week number) 
dependent on the content of water in the reservoirs. From an abstract point of view, the TEP and the 
TGC may be treated in a similar way.  
 
Assume for TEP that a closed market with annual emission quota for the electricity and CHP sector is 
in force. What corresponds to content of water will then for the TEP be the remaining part of the 
emission quota. Thus, if, for example, the remaining part for a given week is below normal (suitably 
defined), then the expected price of TEP will be above normal. For TGC, the amount of certificates 
corresponds to the content of water. Thus, if, for example, the amount for a given week is below nor-
mal (suitably defined), then the expected price of TEP will be above normal. Therefore, the general 
principles of inclusion of the TEP and TGC in the long-term model are clear, although obviously de-
tails differ.  
 
One issue in the interplay between the short and the long-term models is related to the level of details. 
In order to obtain a solution to the long-term model, it will be necessary to sacrifice some details in 
order to reduce calculation time. This may be in the specification of the production units, in the num-
ber of time steps used or otherwise. As is well-known, such simplification will typically imply an un-
derestimation of the calculated optimal cost. This in turn must be corrected in the linkage between the 
short and the long-term models. For the TEP and the TGC, similar effects are expected and they will 
have to be taken care of.     
 
In the Wilmar model, the simple way to include the price of TEP and TGC is to estimate them outside 
the model and then incorporate these values on the joint market model. From the point of view of the 
joint market model, this will be satisfactory. Moreover, it may be argued that since the geographical 
extension considered in the Wilmar model is small compared to the market extensions for TEP and 
TGC, this is the relevant way to do it. This was the idea in the project description.  
 
On the other hand, it may be interesting and relevant in the present project context to provide a model-
ling tool that can treat the situation where the considered geographical extension is large, such that 
climate effects like hydro inflow of wind power variation, or policy issues matter. As indicated above, 
the implementation may in general terms be said to follow the ideas in the long-term model’s imple-
mentation of the water values, but the distinctive details are expected to require considerable atten-
tion. Whether TEP and TGC will be implemented in the long-term model will be decided later.   
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